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firms that change ownership regime, typically levels of employe  ownership
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dominated ownership tend to be most stable in small enterprises. There is
great heterogeneity across firms both in the situation at the time of
privatization and in the following ownership dynamics. These findings are
consistent with an institutionalist perspective that predicts variation across
and within countries and points to roles for factors both at societal and firm
level in accounting for such differences and changes.
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6I   Introduction.
The pivotal importance of privatization and new structures of ownership for
successful transition has been stressed by many. Attentio  has been drawn not only
to ownership (especially whether firms are privately or state owned) but also to
control (by insiders or outsiders) and - in the case of insider control - whether the
controlling group are managers or workers (e.g. Ash and Hare, 1994; Blasi, 1994;
Jones and Weisskopf, 1996; Blasi et al, 1997). For reasons including easier access
to capital markets, the conventional wisdom is that firms with outside ownership
are more efficient than firms with insider ownership (e.g. Boycko t al. 1993).
Furthermore, by allegedly providing superior solutions to agency problems, it is
argued that the most efficient form of insider ownership is manager (rather than
worker) ownership (e.g. Earle et al. 1995).
These theoretical issues concerning new forms of enterprise ownership and control
are all the more salient because, following the widespread use of policies providing
insiders with concessional shares,  employee ownership has proven to be a
widespread feature of the privatization process in several transition economies
(Nuti 1995). While most economists saw this development as somewhat
unexpected and unwelcomed, they also viewed it as likely to be only a temporary
phenomenon. With the development of secondary capital markets, insider
ownership was expected to rapidly diminish in importance; consequently, similar
patterns of ownership would quickly emerge. But others have stressed the
pervasive importance of diverse institutional factors and organizational rigidities;
these would be expected to result both in marked differences only slow evolution
in ownership structures.  For example, Mygind (1997) argues that ownership
structures after privatization are determined both by conditions at the level of
society (especially the social power structure and the resulting political process)
and by factors at the enterprise level (such as size and market situation).  According
to this institutionalist perspective, ownership structures would be expected to vary
across countries  and, within countries,  between enterprises of different sizes and
in different sectors.
To date, the empirical evidence on the nature as well as the economic effects of the
new structures of ownership in transitional economies is quite slim. While there
have been some important early attempts to chart the new patterns of corporate
ownership, these studies usually suffer from problems. These include the
difficulties in obtaining data both for large samples of firms and on the dynamics
7of ownership,  as well as a tendency to focus on selected cases, especially that of
Russia.1 Sometimes the absence of systematic panel data for large samples of firms
has led to mixed and confused findings. For example, Blasi et al.(1997) find
evidence of substantial inertia in ownership structures in Russia, whereas
Bogomolov (1996),   reports evidence of very fast changes in ownership
composition in Russian firms.
In this paper we use data for firms in the Baltics to shed some light on some of
these issues. Since our data are for  large samples  (from 400-700 firms in each of
the Baltic Countries), we are able to provide some of the most reliable data for
these cases. Not only have the Baltic countries been comparatively neglected, but
also they are interesting cases to examine since there were important similarities
in conditions at the start of reforms and yet subsequently there have been important
differences in reform policies, including approaches to privatization. Since our data
are quite rich, often we are able to examine elements of ownership, such as
distribution, that have tended to be neglected. Moreover, since the data are in the
form of panels, we are able to undertake various calculations including constructing
transition matrices for the dynamics of ownership. In turn this enables us to begin
to examine the respective roles that differences at the level of society and the
enterprise may play in accounting for these patterns and changes in ownership.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section (which draws on
relevant  theoretical and empirical work) we discuss  relevant typologies and
provide a conceptual framework. This is followed by discussions of the data and
an overview of the political context for and the nature of privatization in each of the
countries. In the main part of the paper we present our findings for each of the
Baltic Republics. In a concluding section we  discuss some implications of the
work.
II  Typologies and Conceptual Framework
In examining patterns of ownership to date, no uniform approach has been adopted.
Several considerations, including some based on theory and more pragmatic
considerations about the way the data are generated, has influenced the literature.
A major theme in the literature and a focus for our analysis of the change in
ownership structures is whether enterprise ar  own d by insiders or by outsiders.
Insiders include all the people working in the enterprise.  Usually by stressing
agency issues, theorists often have distinguished two groups of insiders: managers
or other employees (in the following also called workers, non-managerial
8employees or just employees). For outsiders, the key distinction is between state
owners (including ownership by local municipalities) and others who may be
divided into domestic private owners and foreign owners. This division is
illustrated in Figure 1, second column.
Figure 1   Determinants behind the ownership dynamics
Development at the level of society
- institutional system (legislation, privatization methods, capital market etc.)
- social power structure, distribution of income and wealth
- political processes
- cultural values
- development in production, inflation,
 -> ->
T1* Preferred
ownership-
structure ->
T0
ownership-
structure
just after
privatization
T0-T1
barriers for
change in
ownership
structure T1   Actual
T1-T2
barriers ....
Development at the enterprise level
- market development, economic performance
- size
- branch, industry
In examining patterns of ownership, one influential approach in the literature (Earl
et al., 1995) is to assume that the corporate governance system is functioning so if
a group owns the majority of the equity it will also effectively control the company.
The alternative approach  involves using a less restrictive condition that a group has
a dominant ownership stake -- it owns a larger part of the shares than other groups.
One problem with this approach is that one cannot be sure that this dominant group
in fact controls the company. Thus if we divide the possible owners into many
groups, a dominant group might be rather small and it will be possible for other
groups to form an alliance and effectively control the company. Therefore, using
dominant ownership will only be relevant if the number of groups in the analysis
are rather low. Also, if it is likely that certain groups will form alliances, it will be
appropriate to add these groups together. In this way it can be argued that the
whole group of private owners should be taken together so the ownership is divided
9between either private or state dominated (column 1 or 4 in Figure 2). At a more
disaggregated level we might argue that insiders would form an alliance, and
private outsiders another alliance (column 5). Subsequently these alliances could
be split according to which partners are dominating the alliance (column 6). Note,
however, that in column 6, the state might dominate even if the state does not own
a majority of the shares.
Figure 2. Typology of owners.
MANAGERS
INSIDERS OTHER
EMPLOYEES
owners/non-owners,
distribution
personsDOMESTIC
PRIVATE institutions, companies
FOREIGN
state
OUTSIDERS
STATE
local municipalities
This is not the case when a classification based on majority ownership is used, as
shown in Figure 2, column 2. This majority ownership approach, however, has the
drawback that in a large number of enterprises there might not be one group with
a majority. However, if the remaining group is divided according to precise criteria,
as is done in column 3, some well defined groups emerge. For these we are able to
make more precise predictions than is the case for dominant ownership (column 9).
Accordingly, while the main part of the analysis will use classifications based on
majority ownership, for comparative purposes we will also use typologies based
on dominant ownership.
The literature also identifies other factors which bear on patterns of ownership,
These include the distribution of ownership on the employees (Mygind, 1987), the
importance of income derived from work compared to ownership of capital (Nuti,
1995),  whether private companies are de novo or transformations of erstwhile state
owned firms (Barberis, et al. 1996; EBRD 1995, Earle et.al. 1995)), and
participation in decision making versus participation in ownership (Ben-N r and
Jones, 1995).2 Unfortunately, usually data are seldom available on all of these
aspects. For example,  in practice it is often very difficult to make the distinction
between de novo companies and privatized companies. Often companies that were
10
subject to Awild privatization@ will formally be registered as a new start up
company, whereas in fact they arose because powerful individuals, usually from a
state owned company, have taken over some profitable assets of an existing
company. In our analysis, while we are unable to distinguish between "de novo"
companies and privatized companies, sometimes we are able to provide information
relevant to some of the other aspects, especially the distribution of ownership on
the employees.
In considering the factors that bear on the initial ownership structure after
privatization, our sense is that the specific advantages different groups have
managed to achieve in the privatization process are of crucial importance.  This line
of argument can be illustrated by Figure 3 which provides a heuristic framework
for the key determinants behind the dynamics of ownership. In this context,
widespread insider ownership can be explained by high political power for the
insiders at the political level combined with their advantages on information and
their power of implementatio  t the enterprise level. However, although insiders
use their potential to acquire a relatively large share of the ownership in the start
of the process, the resulting distribution of ownership might diverge from what the
participants want when trading of shares becomes possible. After a certain time, it
is likely that the preferred situation (T1*) will diverge from the initial distribution
of ownership (T0). However, the preferred situation is not static. Again it will
depend on the development in the conditions at the level of society including
institutional rules (e.g. taxation, definition of ownership rights) social conditions
(distribution of income and wealth), culture (attitude towards being an owner), and
the general economic situation (alternative possibilities for investment, employment
etc.). Also, developments at the enterprise level (e.g. the specific conditions in the
relevant market) will be important in helping to determine the preferred ownership
situation. For reasons such as the lack of transferability of shares, this prefe red
outcome might diverge from what in fact is possible. Also the specific power
structures at the enterprise level, (e.g. with quite strong managers controlling the
actual trading of shares) as well as conditions at the level of society, especially the
development of secondary markets for shares, will strongly influence both the
speed and often the direction of ownership change. In other words, diverse barriers
for change exist so that the ac ual ownership structure in period one, T1, is
expected to be different from the preferred istribution, T1*.
Figure 3. Typology for division in ownership groups
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III  Data and Overview of Political context and Privatization in the Baltics
To examine ownership patterns we have worked closely with the statistical
department in each of the three Baltic Countries. This has enabled us to have
access to Ain-house@ data  already collected on ownership; also, when undertaking
supplementary ownership surveys, this has enabled us to secure a higher response
rate than would otherwise have been the case.3 So far as is possible,  we aimed to
adopt procedures that used survey methods and ownership categories that were
broadly comparable. However,  since the existing data-bases and procedures for
collecting data often differed across countries and over time, in practice it was not
possible to do this. Hence the resulting key variables are not always the same in
each country and survey designs also differed. In Figure 4 we provide an overview
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of the data sets that have been assembled to date.4
Figure 4. Overview over the quantitative data sets and case-studies.
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
ownership
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N surveyed
responses
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time of privatization
Jan.95 Jan.96 Jan 97
 500      461*    470*
 409      423      388
random, stratified
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and size-groups
Jan.95,             Spring
                        1997
                 
5589                167
random for      sub-
small,total       sam-
for L>20          ple
July 1994,  95 & 96
450               700
357               475
industry      industry
                    construct
                     trade
ownership
variables
share of capital
workers, managers
state, foreign,
domestic outsiders,
insider-distribution,
% non-owners
share of         as large +
capital           managers/
state,domes- employees
stic/foreign   distribution
outsiders,      % non-
own
insiders,       
share of capital
employees,managers
state, foreign, do-
mestic outsiders,
% non-owners
* the 1995-sample + later privatized SOEs
The first ownership survey for Est nia was undertaken in the first months of 1995.
The ownership survey scheme was send to 500 enterprises with 5 or more
employees. The enterprises were chosen as a stratified random sample so that 18
different branches and different size groups were represented. Enterprises which
were either 100% state owned enterprises or 100% foreign owned companies were
excluded from the survey, since the ownership distribution for these companies
were already known. We have in the analysis included 232 of the fully state owned
and 25 of fully foreign owned Estonian companies. These firms were included in
the later surveys when they changed ownership. The results are not directly
representative for the whole Estonian economy, but the sample can be "normalized"
using some of the known variables for the whole Estonian economy.
The response rate was higher than 80% for all the three years investigated in
Estonia. This is unusually high rate for these kind of surveys. The first ownership
survey covered both the si uation at the time of privatization and on January 1995.
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The surveys included information about: the distribution of shares on different
owners; the total number of managers and of other employees; and the number of
owners and non-owners among these two groups. There was also included a
question about the differences between large and small employee-owners. Three
alternatives were given about the distribution of shares among the employee
owners: 1)  rather equal, 2) unequal - typical more than 1:2 and 3) very unequal -
typically more than 1:10.
The data gathered in Lithuania have many similarities with the Estonian data,
including a similar survey scheme. However, since privatization in the early years
of transition in Lithuania was in most cases a gradual process, it is difficult to
define a clear date for privatization and thus it proved impossible to collect data on
the distribution of shares at the time of privatization. Instead we arranged for data
on the distribution of ownership to be collected for a particular date, namely July
1, 1994 for relatively large companies in industry (which for a number of years had
been reporting financial data to the statistical department). The response rate for
this first wave was very good--almost 80%. Two later surveys in Lithuania
collected ownership data for July 1995 and July 1996. Coverage was extended to
include construction and trade. For these waves, while the sample size increased
to 500, the response rate fell considerably to around 68%. In large part this
reflected a very low response from some of the smaller companies in construction
and trade.5
The available Aofficial@ Latvian data do not distinguish between managers and
other employees, and special ownership survey comparable to those used in the
other Baltic Republics proved much more difficult to be implemented. Therefore,
most of our data for Latvia contain less detail than those for Estonia and Lithuania.
Nevertheless, the data we have been able to assemble, contain information on many
interesting characteristics for the remaining owner groups. For 1994 we were able
to use a sample for a very large group of enterprises (in fact, 5589) that reported
to the Statistical department's enterprise register. This sample included a random
sample of enterprises with fewer than 20 employees (2096 enterprises) and all
larger firms (3493).  In addition, for 1996, we were able to obtain ownership data
a subsample of 645 enterprises, though this sample is not representative of the
whole Latvian economy. In the spring of 1997 we implemented a detailed manager-
survey with response from 167 enterprises. The total sample was 298 enterprises
of which 42 were reported to have stopped. This means that out of 256 enterprises
the response rate was 65%. These companies were asked about their ownership-
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structure back to 1993, but the information about the later years are probably more
reliable than the historical information uncovered in this survey.
Before turning to the individual country cases it is useful to briefly review some of
the key dimensions of the political context of privatization in the Baltic Republics.
The historical development in the last centuries show many similarities between the
three Baltic countries. Russia dominated all three countries except for a short
period in between the two world wars. However, there are also many important
differences which should be stressed when the differences in political development
and transition strategies are analyzed (Mygin 1996). Latvia and Lithuania have
special Baltic languages while Estonia has a language quite close to Finnish.
Therefore, Estonia from the beginning had stronger Western relations than its
southern neighbors. From a cultural point of view Estonia and Latvia have been
influenced by a German Protestant tradition while Lithuania had closer ties to
Poland and a strong catholic tradition. Compared to Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia
was more industrialized before the Soviet occupation. The later development of
industry in Lithuania was based on the labor reserve from agriculture while in
Estonia and Latvia a massive immigration of workers from other Soviet republics
especially Russia took place. Therefore, the majority of the industrial workers in
the two northern countries had Russian as their mother tongue and the Russian
speaking minority made up 39% in Estonia and 48% in Latvia in 1989 (Hanson,
1990). In Lithuania the Russian minority is less than 10% of the population.
These background differences can to a high extent explain the political develop-
ment and the different transition strategies chosen in the three countries. In the late
1980's and the beginning of the 1990's Lithuania had the strongest confrontation
with Moscow. After full independence in August 1991 the national question played
a minor role in Lithuania, but in Estonia and Latvia the questions concerning the
large Russian minority dominated the political debate and development. The
Russian minority lost most of its political influence since most of immigrants did
not get citizenship and thus did not have voting rights at parliamentary elections.
This change in the political power structure is probably an important explanation
behind the development in the privatization policy in Estonia and Latvia. The
results of privatization in the three Baltic countries are summarized in Figure 5.
Figure 5.  Overview over privatization of enterprises, 1989-96
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
early Small SOEs and new coops, new cooperatives new cooperatives
15
mostly owned by  management.
Soviet leasing, 12 empl.owned
Estonian leasing 200 man.owned
mostly owned by management
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mostly owned by management
Soviet leasing, 60 empl.owned
90-91, E-shares, 2-3% of assets
small Dec 1990 law: insider advantages
80% of 450 employee owned,
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1993  sold   944,   142 mill EEK
1994  sold   126,    68 mill EEK
1995  sold   120,    79 mill EEK
1996  sold     94,  155 mill EEK
total   sold 1284,  445 mill EEK
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1000 jobs   9     26      17      1     53
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Decree March 1991,
1991,6 SOE sold to employees, -
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mill Lats  1994  1995  1996
total price    2     34      25(Nov.)
investment   1      18     20(Nov.)
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firms           14    231   264
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Dec. 1991, Investment Funds,
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        1992   1993   1994   1995
sold  38%   62%    75%    99%
of LIPSP 2926 enterprises,
tenders of min. shares utilities,
46 SOE hard currency sale,
1996 Privatization Agency
privatization for cash
IV  Estonia6   
In Estonia, as in all three countries, the early legislation (before August 1991)
favored insiders, in company take-overs, in small privatization and in more experi-
mental large privatization. The first transformation of state ownership started in
1987 in the form of Asemi private@ or  Asmall state owned enterprises@. Also Anew
cooperatives@ developed quite early and rapidly.7 It s generally assumed that these
enterprises were mainly taken over by managers. The first cases with employee
ownership in this early stage of privatization in Estonia were leased enterprises
established under the Soviet legislation of 1989 (Frydman et al, 1993). In July 1991
this law was changed to Estonian rules and around 200 of such enterprises were
started. The early reform program also favored so-called "peoples enterprises"
which included a type of experimental leasing system for  in iders. But by 1991
only 7 large enterprises had been taken over mainly by insiders with a minimum of
five of these firms  having full employee ownership (Terk, 1996).
After Estonian independence in August 1991 the political climate changed and a
strategy emphasizing  employee ownership was no longer in favor. Thus while the
initial legislation on small privatization which started in January 1991 favored
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insiders, after May 1992 most of these preferences were at least formally taken
away. It is estimated that around 80% of the first wave of 450 small enterprises
were taken over by insiders before the change in policy (Kein & Tali, 1994). 
Subsequently, while insider ownership still continued to be an element in the
privatization process, its importance fell. The bulk of  smal  privatization had been
implemented by the end of 1993. 
From 1992 the strategy for large privatization changed to resemble the German
Treuhandanstalt model. The Estonian Privatization Agency put out large enterprises
for open tender, often announced internationally. The offered price was only one
of the criteria for choosing the buyer, though employees were not given any
preferential treatment. Also the proposed business plan and guarantees for
investments and employment played an important role. In this model the main idea
was to find a core investor. Since substantial capital was needed, foreign capital
had an advantage in this process. Also at this stage, since the managerial group
often had accumulated some capital, it was therefore possible for them to begin to
secure loans in the rapidly developing system of private banks. Furthermore,
domestic capital suppliers were allowed to buy on installment. Hence, at this stage,
alliances between managers and a broad group of employees were no longer
necessary. In addition, foreign capital gained increasing access during this late
stage of large privatization. Only in rare cases did broad groups of employees have
the opportunity to take over their enterprises in this type of privatization. The
Treuhandanstalt model gained speed during 1993 and at the end of 1995 most of
the large enterprises had been privatized.
In the Estonian case, it is also important to appreciate that, in the early years,
insider take-over of enterprises meant that control transferred from Moscow to
Estonia. However, after Estonia's full independence in 1991, this transfer to Estonia
was fulfilled for nearly all enterprises. From this time, the problem for the Estonian
politicians was that an employee take-over would often mean that Russian workers
would take over the ownership. However, at this point the Russian workers had lost
most of their political power, and here lies probably an important explanation
behind the shift in policy (Mygind, 1997a). There was a clear tendency to remove
advantages for insiders and to give a higher priority to external capital including
foreign capital. Partly because of this privatization strategy,  Estonia became one
of the countries in Eastern Europe with the highest foreign investment per capita
(Meyer, 1998). At the end of 1996, 451 large enterprises had been sold through
SPA direct sale at a total price of around 3 bill EEK, (see figure 5).
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Now we turn to findings derived from our survey data. Figure 6 gives an overview
over the distribution of ownership in the Estonian sample at the time of
privatization before January 1995. The 83 enterprises privatized during 1995 and
1996 were included in the 255 state (and municipality) owned enterprises. Among
the 405 responding private enterprises (666-255-6) there are slightly more outside
owned than insider owned. Enterprises with outside majority dominated by
domestic owners constitutes 31% of the private enterprises or 19% of the total.
Outside majority with foreign dominance are at the same level as inside majority
with employee dominance - 22% of the private enterprises or 13% of the total.
Inside majority with management dominance makes out 16% of the private
enterprises and 10% of the total enterprises. 6% had no majority for either state,
outsiders or insiders.
At the top of the table similar results for the ownership structure on January 1995,
1996 and 1997 are shown. Not surprisingly the number of state owned enterprises
have fallen. Many of them have moved to the no answer category, which also
include enterprises closed down. Out of the total of 74 "no answers"  i  J uary
1996, 47 are known to be closed down state owned enterprises. Among the private
enterprises the number with foreign dominance is quite stable while domestic
owned and management owned enterprises are increasing and enterprises with
insider majority with employee dominance are falling.
Based on information about the total distribution of enterprises for different size
groups and branches a "normalization" for the whole economy can be calculated,
see figure 6. The proportion of foreign ownership out of the total number of firms
with 5 or more employees increases in this calculation because foreign ownership
is very high in trade, and at the same time this sector has a high number of
enterprises. Employee ownership was most widespread in agriculture (39%) and
lowest in transport (3%) in January 1995. Manager ownership was most
widespread in fishing, mining and wood production (27%)
18
Figure 6Estonia: Ownershipstructure January 1995 (some from Jan. 1997)
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-
666 (100)
666 (100)
11158(100)
666 (100)
11556(100)
EMPLOYEES
5-19   
20-99
100-  
 normalized
3315(41)
902(33)
166(38)
 whole
1823(23)
346(13)
34  (8)
 economy
1226(15)
500(18)
135(31)
570  (7)
466(17)
28  (6)
790 (10)
368 (14)
73 (17)
292 (4)
122 (5)
0 (0)
-
-
-
8017(100)
2705(100)
436(100)
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
205    
13    
47    
 128    
66    
10    
22    
68    
118      
21     
59     
146     
59    
20    
32    
62    
137   
26   
60   
138   
26   
10   
22   
38   
-
-
-
-
133
14
42
110
BRANCHES
agricult.
fish,mine,wood
manu. food etc
manu. paper et
construction
trade
transport
service
 normalized
285(28)
179(31)
126(20)
239(22)
696(57)
1748(43)
132(26)
977(47)
 whole
0 (0)
28 (5)
54 (8)
173(16)
61 (5)
1404(35)
99 (20)
383(18)
 economy
338 (33)
144 (25)
227 (35)
361 (34)
223 (18)
255   (6)
116 (23)
197   (9)
0   (0)
154 (27)
81 (13)
121 (11)
86   (7)
255   (6)
75 (15)
293 (14)
390 (39)
67 (12)
109 (17)
94   (9)
115   (9)
343   (9)
17   (3)
96   (5)
0 (0)
3 (1)
46 (7)
80 (7)
41 (3)
29 (1)
64(13)
153 (7)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1013(100)
576(100)
642(100)
1068(100)
1222(100)
4035(100)
504(100)
2098(100)
nom. capital /
employee1000EEK
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
0-25% firms
75-100% firms
35
2
10
28
0 (0)
3 (3)
299
5
49
141
9   (9)
44 (44)
34
2
8
29
22 (22)
42 (42)
6
1
2
7
27 (26)
6   (6)
4
0
1
5
30 (29)
3   (3)
13
0
1
7
14 (14)
3   (3)
-
-
-
-
0 (0)
0 (0)
66
0,7
4
22
102 (100)
101 (100)
total assets /
employee1000EEK
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
0-25% firms
75-100% firms
412
19
56
122
67 (42)
59 (37)
398
71
161
437
5   (3)
53 (33)
154
30
57
125
23 (14)
36 (22)
44
15
34
61
33 (21)
5   (3)
42
16
35
52
25 (16)
2   (1)
179
20
60
99
8 (5)
6 (4)
-
-
-
-
0 (0)
0 (0)
258
24
54
123
161 (100)
161 (100)
Year of
privatization
-1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995 (own ult.)
1996 (own ult.)
total
6   (5)
5   (5)
6   (5)
3   (4)
3 (11)
4   (8)
14 (45)
41   (8)
7 (10)
13 (12)
30 (24)
12 (15)
2   (7)
5 (10)
2   (6)
71 (14)
22 (32)
25 (23)
40 (32)
27 (35)
11 (41)
25 (48)
7 (23)
157 (32)
13 (19)
24 (22)
16 (13)
8 (10)
4 (15)
11 (21)
3 (10)
79 (16)
9 (13)
31 (28)
23 (18)
20 (26)
5 (19)
0   (0)
0   (0)
88 (18)
10(14)
10  (9)
9  (7)
7  (9)
2  (7)
3  (6)
1  (3)
42  (9)
2  (3)
1  (1)
2  (2)
1  (1)
0  (0)
4  (7)
4(13)
14  (3)
69 (100)
109 (100)
126 (100)
78 (100)
27 (100)
52 (100)
31 (100)
492 (100)
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and lowest in trade (6%).  However, by January 1997 the share of manager
ownership for the whole economy increased to 26%, and for trade to 13%, not
reported.
A normalization based on capital show that foreign ownership amounted to 52%
of the nominal capital for the privatized enterprises on January 19958. This high
proportion of foreign ownership is closely related to the strategy of privatization,
a consistent transition policy concerning stabilization and liberalization, and also
the proximity to Finland must be taken into account (Mygind, 1997b).
There is no clear tendency in the distribution between different ownership types
concerning the average size measured as the average employment in 1994. Only
state owned enterprises tend to be relatively large with an average size of 205
employees. A few very large stat owned enterprises account for this result since
the median state owned enterprises are on the level with the whole sample. The
high number of small foreign owned trading companies explains why foreign
ownership is most common for small enterprises, (average of 66 employees). Also
insider majority owned enterprises with management dominance tend to be rather
small. Comparing these results with the situation of ownership in January 1997 and
average employment in 1996 (not reported in the figure) it is striking that most of
the large employee dominated enterprises in the sample have disappeared. At the
time of privatization there were 28 employee dominated enterprises with more than
100 employees in the sample. By January 1997 this number had fallen to 9. For the
similar enterprises with less than 100 employees the numbers fell from 60 at the
time of privatization to 42 in January 1997. Normalized for the whole economy
employee ownership had in 1995 a higher proportion in large enterprises (17%)
than in small (10%), but in 1997 the proportion of employee ownership in large
enterprises fell to 7% (not reported). For management dominated enterprises
especially the number of small enterprises in the sample increased. Domestic
outside majority owned increased their share especially for large enterprises.
Capital intensity both measured as total assets per employee and nominal capital
per employees is relatively high in foreign owned enterprises and relatively low for
insider owned enterprises. Nominal capital per employee is only 2000 EEK per
employee or less for more than half of the insider owned enterprises. In the 25%
of enterprises with the lowest nominal capital per employee 26% of the enterprises
are management owned and 29% employee owned. In the 25% of enterprises with
the highest capital intensity the are only 4% insider owned enterprises. In this
category state owned enterprises (37%) and foreign owned enterprises (33%) are
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dominating. The average number of 299,000 EEK per employee in foreign owned
companies versus 4,000 in employee dominated enterprises show a striking
difference. For total assets the difference is Aonly@ ten times higher in foreign
owned than in insider owned. These results can probably partly be explained by the
fact that outsiders especially foreigners can afford enterprises with a higher capital
per employee. Also, typically foreign owners have paid a price that is relatively
high (at least compared to insiders) for similar enterprises. Relatedly, foreign
capital was mainly used to buy enterprises in the later stages, with insiders
dominating during the early stages of the privatization process.
This last point is supported  by the observation that insider takeovers were
especially important during the early stages of privatization. This is shown at the
bottom of figure 6. Insider ownership was very important especially in 1991, when
takeovers with broad employee ownership were quite prevalent. During 1992-1994,
after the ending of preferences for insiders, we see that the percentage of nominal
capital owned by outsiders has become more important.9 In 1995 and 1996, 65 of
out of 243 state owned enterprises were privatized. It is worth noting that in this
group there were no cases of insider majority with employee dominance. Nearly
half of the responding enterprises (46%) went to majority outside domestic
ownership, 16% to majority foreign ownership, 25% to management dominated
insider ownership, and 7% to no majority.
The variation in the incidence of employee ownership also applies across
individuals as well as firms. Thus from data on the Atake-up@ rate for employee
ownership, we find that even in enterprises with majority broad employee
ownership, normalized for the whole economy on average 46 were not owners in
January 1995, for the sample the average was 38%, see figure 7. This percentage
increased to 52% in January 1997. Moreover, this Aparticipation rate@ varies
enormously across sectors. Whereas in agriculture the sample shows that on
average only 22% were not owners in January 1995, in other sectors including
hotels and restaurants and transport, more than 90% of the employees are non-
owners. For January 1995 there is a slight tendency to find more non-owners in
smaller enterprises. However, for 1997 the opposite tendency is dominating, see
figure 7. There is a both tendency of a fall in the total number of employees in large
employee dominated enterprises and an increase in the percentage of non ow in
employees in these enterprises. This confirms the earlier stated result that employee
ownership seems to be most stable in small enterprises. For the whole sample in
January 1995, 76% of employees were non-owners and, normalized for the whole
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economy, there were 71% non owners. These percentages increase to 84% and
(normalized)% in January 1997.
Figure 7   Percent of employees who are not owners
Shares owned by employees
in % of total shares
January 1, 1995
0% 0-10% 10-30% 30-50%
employee
owned
30-50%
management
owned
50-100%
employee
owned
50-100%
management
owned
Total
Number of employees Total no
own
Totalno
own
Totalno
own
Totalno
own
Total no
own
Totalno
own
Total no
own
Total no
own
5 –19 employees             19959100% 53787% 9571% 2236% 185 76% 10637% 359 77% 226387%
20-99 employees            19951683100% 32373% 57382% 26440% 340 82%136452% 231885% 686579%
More than 99 employees199515053100%479269%206559%202855% 571 82%813235% 268586%3532675%
total                               199517095100%565271%273365%231453% 109681%960238% 536285%4445476%
5 –19 employees            1997335100% 7963% 7686% 18147% 59 83% 14238% 235 76% 110774%
20-99 employees           19972611100% 33687% 50564% 22344% 382 85%187760% 226591% 819983%
More than 99 employees199714929100%455786%265174% 81140% 130091%385948% 271576%3082285%
total                               199717875100%497286%323273%121542% 174189%587852% 521583%4012884%
The survey also generated information on the distribution of ownership within the
group of employee owners. In 65% of the small enterprises with employee
ownership, the distribution of ownership was reported as being fairly equal among
employees who are owners, see figure 8. The percentage increased to 71% in 1997.
In large enterprises with more than 99 employees this percentage was
approximately the same for the two years, 31-32%. In this group about half of the
cases indicate a very unequal distribution with differences typically more than 1:10.
Again the tendency of stabilization of employee ownership in small enterprises are
revealed.
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Figure 8  Distribution of shares among the employees who are owners.
Percent of enterprises where
Shares are distributed
Rather equalUnequal,
more than 1:2
Very unequal
more than 1:10
Total
T O T A L  1995 1997  1995  1997  1995  1997 97/95
5 –19 employees 65 71 20 21 14 8 100
20-99 employees 60 50 18 22 23 28 100
More than 99 employees 31 32 22 17 47 52 100
Total 52 51 20 20 28 29 100
From many studies of other countries it is well known that broad employee
ownership of capital does not necessarily mean that the employees have a similar
degree of control (e.g. for Russia, Bla i et al. 1997; Jones and Weisskopf, 1996).
One reason why this is likely also to be the case in Estonia is because the system
of non-voting shares for employees is especially frequent in cases in which there
is a high degree of broad employee ownership (figure 9). 47% of large enterprises
with majority employee ownership had this type of governance structure in January
1995. This number fell to 41% in 1997. In General the number of enterprises with
voting discrimination against employees has decreased from 17% to 13%. In the
new company law from 1995 the possibility of making different voting classes was
abolished. Again it is worth noting that the purest form of employee ownership is
found in small enterprises.
Figure 9  Percentage of firms with some shares with less votes than others
                January 1995 and January 1997.
Shares owned
by employees
in % of total shares
0% 0-10% 10-30% 30-50%
employee
owned
30-50%
management
owned
50-100%
employee
owned
50-100%
management
owned
Total
number of firms and
percentage of firms
Total
firms
less
votes
Total
firms
less
votes
Total
firms
less
votes
Total
firms
less
votes
Total
firms
less
votes
Total
firms
less
votes
Total
firms
less
votes
Total
firms
less
votes
5-19 employees  48 0% 8 0% 11 27% 3 0% 13 8% 11 18% 23 13% 117 8%
20-99 employees 36 0% 7 14% 13 23% 6 50% 9 11% 33 39% 55 27% 15923%
100-  employees 52 0% 15 7% 11 18% 11 27% 4 0% 30 47% 15 33% 13818%
total               1995 136 0% 30 7% 35 23% 20 30% 26 8% 74 39% 93 25% 41417%
5-19 employees  28 0% 8 0% 8 13% 4 25% 8 13% 13 8% 26 8% 95 6%
20-99 employees 55 0% 7 29% 11 18% 6 17% 10 20% 41 37% 49 8% 17915%
100-  employees 49 0% 14 14% 10 20% 5 60% 7 29% 17 41% 12 33% 11418%
total               1997 132 0% 29 14% 29 17% 15 33% 25 20% 71 32% 87 11% 38813%
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As indicated earlier, for several reasons we are particularly interested in the
dynamics of ownership. By using our survey data we are able to examine changes
in ownership in sample firms between the time of privatization and subsequent
times. Some of these results have already been reported in figure 6. To analyze the
dynamics more closely we present two transition matrices in figure 10 and figure
11. Figure 10 shows the same ownership categories presented earlier, comparing
the change from the situation at the time of privatization and the situation on
January 1997. The earlier shown fall in employee ownership from 88 to 52
enterprises is shown, but additionally it can be seen that this change covers a stable
group of 38 enterprises combined with a deduction of 50 enterprises and an
addition of 14 enterprises. The flow away from employee dominance has gone
mainly to management dominance, 21 cases, and to domestic outside ownership,
17 cases. Only 4 enterprises have developed in the other direction from
management to employee dominance and only 3 from domestic to employee
ownership. Management ownership has got 14 case from domestic outside
ownership and 16 cases from state ownership. It is revealing to see that the number
with no clear majority ownership group has fallen from 38 to 17, indicating a strong
tendency in Estonia for an ownership configuration to emerge in which there is a
clear core-owner. Most of the no-majority cases have gone to domestic and
management ownership.
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Figure 10  Transition matrix Estonia -
                   majority at privatization by majority January 1997
majority January 1997
outsiders insiders
majority at time
of privatization
state
foreign domesticmanagers employees
no
majo-
rity
no
answer
total
state 110 
(43)
15
(6)
33
(13)
16
(6)
2
(1)
3
(1)
76
(30)
255
(100)
outsider
foreign>domestic
0
(0)
64
(72)
1
(1)
3
(3)
1
(1)
1
(1)
19
(21)
89
(100)
outsider
domestic>foreign
0
(0)
2
(2)
79
(63)
14
(11)
3
(3)
2
(2)
25
(20)
125
(100)
insider
managers>employees
0
(0)
1
(2)
5
(8)
44
(68)
4
(6)
2
(3)
9
(14)
65
(100)
insider
employees>managers
0
(0)
1
(1)
17
(19)
21
(24)
38
(43)
2
(2)
9
(10)
88
(100)
no majority 0
(0)
3
(8)
9
(24)
5
(13)
3
(8)
7
(18)
11
(29)
38
(100)
no answer 0
(0)
0
(0)
1
(17)
3
(50)
1
(17)
0
(0)
1
 (17)
6
(100)
total 
privatization
255
(38)
89
(13)
125
(19)
65
(10)
88
(13)
38
(6)
6
(1)
666
(100)
total
Jan. 1995
243
(36)
96
(14)
144
(22)
83
(12)
74
(11)
26
(4)
0
(0)
666
(100)
total
Jan. 1996
162
(24)
89
(13)
155
(23)
94
(14)
71
(11)
21
(3)
74
(11)
666
(100)
total
Jan. 1997
110
(17)
86
(13)
145
(22)
106
(16)
52
(8)
17
(3)
150
(23)
666
(100)
Excluding the no-answer group and the state-owned group, only looking at changes
within the private ownership enterprises giving information for the two dates, 100
enterprises have changed category while 232 have been stable. This means a
change of 100/332 = 30% in the period of approximately 3 years - a quite dynamic
ownership adjustment. From the time of privatization to January 1995 this transition
percentage was 71/405 = 18%, from 1995 to 1996 it was 52/373 = 14%, and from
1996 to 1997 it was 60/378 = 16%. (The sum of the three periods is less than 30
because a firm can change more than once).
Figure 11  Transition matrix Estonia -
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                   degrees of employee ownership at privatization by January 1997
Time of
privatization
January 1997
employeeshares0% 0-5% 5-10%10-30%30-50%50-100%100%
no datatotal
0% 332
(67)
13  (3)5   (1) 14  (3) 5   (1) 4   (1) 0  (0) 126
(25)
499 (100)
0-5% 2 (20)6 (60)0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0  (0) 2 (20) 10 (100)
5-10% 1 (14)2 (29)1 (14) 0   (0) 1 (14) 0   (0) 0  (0) 2 (29) 7 (100)
10-30% 4 (15)0   (0)3 (19)15 (27) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0  (0) 4 (15) 26 (100)
30-50% 0   (0)1   (4)4 (17) 6 (25) 5 (21) 3 (13) 0  (0) 5 (21) 24 (100)
50-100% 6   (7)5   (6)3   (4)19 (22)19 (22) 25 (29)0  (0) 8   (9) 85 (100)
100% 0   (0)0   (0)0   (0) 0   (0) 2 (22) 3 (33) 2(22) 2 (22) 9 (100)
no data 3 (50)0   (0)0   (0) 1 (17) 0   (0) 1 (17) 0  (0) 1 (17) 6 (100)
total at priv. 499
(75)
10  (2)7   (1) 26  (4) 24  (4) 85 (13)9  (1) 6   (1)666 (100)
total Jan. 1995 476
(71)
25  (4)11  (2) 52  (8) 34  (5) 61   (9)7  (1) 0   (0)666 (100)
total Jan. 1996 409
(61)
23  (3)17  (3) 49  (7) 35  (5) 50   (8)6  (1) 77 (12)666 (100)
total Jan. 1997 348
(52)
27  (4)16  (2) 55  (8) 32  (5) 36   (5)2  (0) 150
(23)
666 (100)
Figure 11 shows a transition matrix for employee ownership comparing the time of
privatization and January 1997. There is a clear tendency so that the
frequency of the high degree employee ownership are falling and the frequency of
the low degree of employee ownership are increasing. The cases with 0% employee
shares includes mainly state owned enterprises. Thus the fall in this category
reflects privatization. From the matrix it can be seen that the 85 enterprises with 50-
100% employee ownership at the time of privatization has been reduced to 36
enterprises. The enterprises have transferred mainly to the neighboring categories
10-30% and 30-50%, but some majority employee owned enterprises has also
transferred to the lowest categories of employee ownership. Only 45 enterprises
have jumped to a category with higher employee ownership and of these 41
enterprises have jumped from 0, indicating that it covers mainly privatization cases.
80 enterprises have moved in the other direction. A similar transition matrix for
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management ownership (not shown) shows complementing tendencies: fall in the
low categories and an increasing number of enterprises in the high categories of
management ownership. This is not surprising seen in combination with the earlier
mentioned tendency of transfer from employee to management ownership.
V   Latvia10
While developments in Latvia have many similarities with those in Estonia, political
developments were more unstable and a political deadlock dominated the situation
for some years. Accordingly, stabilizaion came a little later, liberalization was not
so extensive and initially the privatizat on process was much slower. As in Estonia,
initially many new cooperatives were established, and leasing according to the
Soviet legislation also had some importance (See Figure 5). The early years of
transition also gave some advant ges for insiders concerning small privatization.
In addition, six experimental privatization of large enterprises were implemented
in 1991 and most of the ownership in these firms was transferred to insiders.
Finally, the initial legislation on large privatization formally included some
preferences for employees for buying 10-20% of the shares in their enterprise
(Frydman et al, 1993). But  as in Estonia, most of  the initial advantages for insiders
were subsequently (in 1992) formally taken away (Mygind 1997). However, it
seems that in the actual implementation of these changes, the advantages for
employees prevailed for a long time (Vojevoda and Rumpis, 1993). Until 1994 the
privatization process appears to have been quite decentralized, and to have given
a key role to different ministries. This meant that the existing networks could be
used to the advantage of insiders. Mostly by using the method of leasing with an
option to buy, insiders (especially managers) had good opportunities to take over
their enterprises. However, until 1994,  privatization was rather slow and this type
of privatization only included around 200-300 firms.
As in Estonia, after 1994 the legislation was changed in the direction of a
Treuhandmodel. The Latvian Privatization Agency made its first international
tender in the end of 1994, but in both 1995 and 1996 the process proceeded
relatively slowly. The centralization of the privatization process in the Latvian
Privatization Agency speeded up the process somewhat, although it remained 
slower than in the other Baltic states. Mainly through a tender process, 14
enterprises were sold in 1994, 231 in 1995 and 264 in 1996. Most of these sales
were to domestic outsiders and some to foreign owners, and insiders played a
minor role. This was also the case for public offerings which started in August
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1995. In both types of privatization it was possible to pay by vouchers, and
according to the figures from the sta istical department, on average 59% of the total
price was paid with vouchers.
Turning to our survey data, in Table 12 we show ownership distribution for 5589
enterprises for January 1995.The ownership distribution is quite interesting since
typically one group of owners has more than 50% of the ownership and in only 2%
of the enterprises did no group of owners have a majority of the ownership. In 16%
of cases, enterprises were mainly owned by the state and municipalities, 5% of
firms were owned by foreigners,  26% by domestic outsiders while in 51% of
firms insiders owned more than 50%.
Based on a survey on managers in 167 enterprises we have evidence for the
distribution between managers and other employees in companies. These results
are in figure 12 used to divide the insider ownership in two groups. However, it
must be noted that this procedure includes some modifications since the 73
enterprises with majority insider ownership is not a representative sample of the
total. First of all they have 20 or more employees. From the small sample we can
see that employee and management dominance have the same frequency for
enterprises with 20 or more employees.
As can also be seen from figure 12 state ownership was still quite high in
manufacturing with, the state having majority in around 24% of the enterprises. In
particular, the state maintains a strong ownership stake among the largest
enterprises and 54% of firms with more than 500 employees were still
predominantly state owned in January 1995. At the same time, on average,  the
state owned less than 15% of enterprises with fewer than 100 employees. These
small enterprises have mainly been taken over by insiders and more than 50% of
companies with fewer than 100 employees are majority insider owned. More
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Figure 12    Latvia: Ownershipstructure, January 1, 1995
                        size, branches, capital intensity
majority
outsiders insiders
Frequency
(row percent)
state
foreign>domdomestic>f total managers>e employees>m
no
majo-
rity
total
TOTAL 895 (16)279 (5)1464(26)2838 (51)36 (25)*37 (25)* 113 (2) 5589 (100)
EMPLOYEES
1-4
5-19
20-99
100-199
200-
47  (6)
196 (15)
366 (14)
119 (24)
165 (41)
23  (3)
62  (5)
141 (5)
28  (6)
25  (6)
161 (21)
332 (25)
693 (27)
160 (32)
118 (29)
528 (67)
681 (52)
1343 (52)
193 (39)
93 (23)
-
-
(29)*
(22)*
(0)*
-
-
(23)*
(17)*
(23)*
26 (3)
38 (3)
44 (2)
3 (1)
2 (0)
785 (100)
1311 (100)
2587 (100)
503 (100)
403 (100)
Average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
215
17
52
145
70
16
33
76
74
13
33
77
45
7
23
44
64*
25*
40*
102*
182*
38*
83*
184*
31
5
17
36
BRANCHES
Agricult. fishing
Mining wood
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Construction
Trade
Transport
Service
72 (12)
93 (19)
130 (22)
51 (26)
102 (13)
217 (14)
75 (20)
153 (15)
5  (1)
29  (6)
36  (6)
13  (7)
15  (2)
105  (7)
49 (13)
27  (3)
124 (20)
101 (20)
92 (16)
19 (10)
180 (24)
379 (24)
112 (30)
453 (46)
406 (67)
269 (54)
310 (53)
108 (55)
455 (60)
825 (52)
130 (34)
332 (34)
(11)*
(27)*
(32)*
(14)*
(43)*
(39)*
(34)*
-
(56)*
(27)*
(21)*
(41)*
(17)*
(13)*
(0)*
-
2 (0)
7 (1)
12 (2)
4 (2)
7 (1)
47 (3)
11 (3)
23 (2)
609 (100)
499 (100)
580 (100)
195 (100)
759 (100)
1573 (100)
377 (100)
988 (100)
Nominal capital
/employee 1000 lat
average
25% quartile
median
75% quart.
0-25% firms
75-100% firms
5289
380
1663
3965
16  (1)
512 (37)
6568
125
1137
5333
34 (3)
136(10)
5170
99
538
2240
176 (13)
525 (38)
477
7
35
211
1097 (81)
200 (14)
488*
4*
90*
1035*
(52)*
(7)*
630*
58*
195*
650*
(29)*
(7)*
3696
13
100
625
32 (2)
23 (2)
2846
20
165
1200
1355 (100)
1396 (100)
year of
privatization
1991
1992
1993
1994
total
8 (26)*
0   (0)*
4 (10)*
4 (29)*
16 (11)*
2   (6)*
4   (7)*
4 (10)*
1   (7)*
11 (8)*
3 (10)*
15 (27)*
14 (35)*
2 (14)*
34 (24)*
14 (35)*
35 (64)*
17 (43)*
7 (50)*
73 (52)*
7 (23)*
17 (31)*
7 (18)*
5 (36)*
36 (26)*
7 (18)*
18 (33)*
10 (25)*
2 (14)*
37 (26)*
4 (13)*
1  (2)*
1  (2)*
0  (0)*
6  (4)*
31 (100)*
55 (100)*
40 (100)*
14 (100)*
140 (100)*
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* the numbers are based on the sample of 167 enterprises with 20 or more employees, percentages are
   normalized so the total equals insiders total, numbers for employees and nominal capital cannot be
   directly compared with other ownership groups.
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than two thirds of enterprises with 1- 4 employees were majority insider owned.
For enterprises with more than 500 employees the corresponding figure  is only 18.
Most of the enterprises with majority insider ownership in 1995 were 100% owned
by insiders. It is striking that for enterprises with 20-199 employees there is slightly
more management owned enterprises than employee owned. However, for large
enterprises with more than 200 employees we have no enterprises with
management dominance in our small sample of 167 enterprises.
There is substantial dispersion in the extent of insider ownership across sectors. In
Latvia, we find that insider ownership is highest in agriculture and fishing and
lowest in transport and services. At the same time from the small sample it can be
seen that the bulk of insider owned enterprises in agriculture and fishing are
broadly owned by employees, in manufacturing there is about balance, while
managers are dominating in sectors such as construction, trade and transport.
Figure 12 shows some data for capital intensity, measured as nominal capital per
employee. There is a similar tendency like in Estonia that enterprises with insider
majority have much lower (around ten times lower) capital intensity than other
enterprises.  This is also confirmed by the data from the small sample. These data
do not point to significant differences between management and employee
dominated enterprises.
A distribution based on the year of privatization for the small sample is shown at
the bottom of the table. However, from these results no clear tendencies can be
seen, so a tendency to lower insider or lower employee ownership cannot be
confirmed.
Figure 13 Percent of employees who are not owners - Latvia, 1994 and 1996
Shares owned by
employees
in % of total shares
0% 0-10% 10-30% 30-50%
employee
owned
30-50%
management
owned
50-100%
employee
wned
50-100%
management
owned
Total
number of
employees
totalno
own
total no
own
total no
own
total no
own
total no
own
total no
own
total no
own
total no
own
firms
5 -19 employees 11100% 0 - 0 - 0 - 19 84% 9 0% 53 79% 92 74% 10
20-99 employees 521100% 30 0% 60276% 252 26% 156 78%1040 40% 1013 91% 424372% 98
100-199 employees760100% 0 - 28648% 393 58% 135 96% 767 65% 795 93% 386883% 31
> 200 employees1929100%140327% 37371% 594 19% 0 - 4481 36% 208100%1046757% 19
total 1994 3221100%143326% 126168%1239 33% 310 86%6298 40% 2069 93%1867166% 160
5 -19 employees 19100% 0 - 16 94% 0 - 0 - 27 37% 67 85% 14780% 7
20-99 employees 726100% 0 - 60951% 208 41% 150 85% 848 54% 1524 80% 468673% 90
100-199 employees648100% 0 - 21866% 440 68% 0 - 1181 47% 988 98% 408479% 30
> 200 employees1249100%116550% 47228% 204 0% 0 - 3109 32% 0 - 756357% 25
total 1996 2642100%116550% 131546% 852 45% 153 84%5166 39% 2579 87%1648467% 153
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From the study of the 167 enterprises we also have evidence about the distribution
within the group of employees. The numb r of non-owners are shown in figure 13.
The tendency known from Estonia with a more equally distributed ownership in
small enterprises cannot be confirmed in the Latvian sample. Not surprisingly the
percentage of non-owners are higher for management dominated than for employee
dominated ownership. Surprisingly the percentage of no  owners for 0-10% insider
ownership in 1994 is very low. However, because of the low number of companies
no conclusions can be drawn from this fact, and in 1996 the figures looks more
reasonable. There is not a tendency for an increasing number of non-owners from
1994 to 1996. For both years about one third of the employees in sample own
shares in their own enterprise. The distribution of shares among the employee is
rather equal for half of the enterprises with some insider ownership and Aunequal@
for 25% and Avery unequal@ for the remaining 25%, see figure 14. This is the same
pattern as in Estonia, but unlike Estonia the numbers do not show a significant
variation between different size groups.
Figure 14  Latvia - distribution of shares among employee owners
Enterprises where shares are
distributed                      (%)
R ther equalUnequal,
more than 1:2
Very unequal
more than 1:10
Total
T O T A L       1996       1996         1996     1996
1 -19 employees 3 (33) 1 (11) 5 (56) 9 (100)
20-99 employees 42 (55) 19 (25) 16 (21) 77 (100)
more than 99 employees 15 (44) 10 (29) 9 (26) 34 (100)
Total 60 (50) 30 (25) 30 (25) 120 (100)
The dynamics of ownership in Latvia can be usefully examined by constructing
transition matrices based on the survey on the 167 enterprises analyzed for the
period 1993-1996. In the transition matrix shown in figure 15 the results in the end
of 1994 are compared with the results ultimo 1996. We have not gone back to 1993
since the number of non-answers here is as high as 28%. The enterprises were
asked in 1997 about their ownership structure in the preceding four years. The
reliability of the data is probably falling the further back in time we go, and there
is probably a tendency to underreport changes in ownership since it is simply easier
to answer Aunchanged@ instead of specifying the changes. Even with this concern,
the transition matrix do show some
Figure 15  Transition matrix Latvia - majority ultimo 1994 by ultimo 1996
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majority ultimo 1996
outsiders insidersMajority
Ultimo 1994
state
foreign domesticmanagers employees
no
majo-
rity
no
answer
total
State 12 
(75)
1
(6)
0
(0)
2
(13)
0
(0)
1
(6)
0
(0)
16
(100)
Outsider
foreign>domestic
0
(0)
10
(91)
0
(0)
1
(9)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
11
(100)
Outsider
Domestic>foreign
0
(0)
1
(3)
29
(85)
2
(6)
1
(3)
1
(3)
1
(3)
34
(100)
Insider
Managers>employees
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
36
(100)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
36
(100)
Insider
Employees>managers
0
(0)
0
(0)
3
(8)
3
(8)
30
(81)
1
(3)
0
(0)
37
(100)
no majority 0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
6
(100)
0
(0)
6
(100)
no answer 1
(4)
1
(4)
2
(7)
0
(0)
2
(7)
1
(4)
20
(74)
27
(100)
total 1993 15
(9)
7
(4)
29
(17)
29
(17)
34
(20)
6
(4)
47
(28)
167
(100)
total 1994 16
(9)
11
(7)
34
(20)
36
(22)
37
(22)
6
(4)
27
(16
167
(100)
total 1995 14
(8)
13
(8)
35
(21)
38
(23)
35
(21)
9
(5)
23
(14)
167
(100)
total 1996 13
(8)
13
(8)
34
(20
44
(26)
33
(20)
10
(6)
20
(12)
167
(100)
interesting developments. 4 companies have been privatized from 1994 to 1996. 5
out of 34 enterprises with domestic outside ownership have changed, and most
markedly 7 out of 37 employee dominated insider majority have changed, 3 to
management dominance, 3 to domestic ownership and one to no majority. Looking
at the summary table at the bottom there is a tendency for foreign ownership,
management ownership and no majority ownership to increase. The tendency from
Estonia with falling employee ownership is also reflected in the transition matrix
in figure 16. A closer analysis shows that the ownership is especially shifting from
employees to managers like it was the case in Estonia, although there is a weaker
tendency in the Latvian data. Measuring the speed of change for majority
ownership (excluding changes including state and no-answers) show a change
between 4% and 7% year to year, and a 18% change from 1993 to 1996. This is
about half the speed of change compared to Estonia. This can probably partly be
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explained by a bias in the data-collection method, but a it also indicates a more
open and dynamic market for ownership in Estonia. (In fact, an analysis of 694
enterprises on ownership in 1994 and 1995, but insiders not divided in managers
and other employees, show that the ownership change is 7.6% compared to 3.7%
in the small sample of 167 enterprises).
Figure 16  Transition matrix Latvia -
                   degrees of employee ownership ultimo 1994 by ultimo 1996
Ultimo 1994 ultimo 1996
Employeeshares0% 0-5% 5-10% 10-30%30-50%50-100%100%
no data  total
0% 60 (94)0   (0) 0   (0) 2   (3) 1   (2) 1   (2) 0   (0) 0   (0) 64 (100)
0-5% 1 (13)4 (50) 0   (0) 2 (25) 1 (13) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 8 (100)
5-10% 0   (0)1 (17) 4 (67) 1 (17) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 6 (100)
10-30% 2 (12)1   (6) 2 (12) 12 (71) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 17 (100)
30-50% 0   (0)0   (0) 0   (0) 2 (22) 6 (67) 1 (11) 0   (0) 0   (0) 9 (100)
50-100% 0   (0)0   (0) 0   (0) 4 (12) 3 (92) 27 (79) 0   (0) 0   (0) 34 (100)
100% 0   (0)0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0  (0) 0   (0) 1 (50) 1 (50) 2 (100)
no data 4 (15)0   (0) 0   (0) 1   (4) 0  (0) 2   (7) 0   (0) 20 (74) 27 (100)
total ult. 1993 53 (32)5   (3) 6   (4) 15   (9) 9  (5) 30 (18) 2   (1) 47 (28) 167 (100)
total ult. 1994 64 (38)8   (5) 6   (4) 17 (10) 34  (5) 34 (20) 2   (1) 27 (16) 167 (100)
total ult. 1995 67 (40)9   (6) 4   (2) 20 (12) 35  (5) 32 (19) 2   (1) 23 (14) 167 (100)
total ult. 1996 67 (40)6   (4) 6   (4) 24 (14) 11  (7) 32 (19) 1   (1) 20 (12) 167 (100)
VI  Lithuania11
In the first years of transition, Lithuania had the fastest pace of privatization and the
biggest emphasis on employee ownership in the Baltic countries (see figure 5).
While privatization according to Soviet legislation in the form of new cooperatives
and leasing was probably not so developed as in Estonia and Latvia, as early as
1990-1991, a temporary law which gave the first possibility of distributing shares
to employees, was impleentd. Privatization legislation for both small and large
firms was already passed at the start of 1991. The most important of these
measures was the ambitious voucher program, LIPSP, which was passed in
February 1991 and already being implemented in September 1991. A feature of the
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LIPSP was that from an early stage egalitarian ideas have had a strong role in the
major part of Lithuanian privatization.
 Under LIPSP (which is one of the earliest implementations of a mass-privatization
program in Eastern Europe), employees had the opportunity to buy a certain
percentage of the shares in the first round at concessional rates before most of the
remaining shares were sold in public offerings in later rounds. This percentage of
shares available for employees was increased from 10% in 1991, to 30% in 1992
and to 50% after the labor party took over the government in early 1993.
Employees could use vouchers as cash to buy shares. The price paid in the first
round was usually below the market price. Moreover, because of only partial
indexation of the price of the assets and on the value of the vouchers, the advantage
of employees increased over time (Martinavicius, 1996). This system made it
possible for  employees to obtain  a considerable part of the ownership even in
large enterprises with relatively high capital-intensity. Also while the 20% extra
shares reserved for employees after 1993 initially did not have any voting rights,
later in the process it was made possible for the general meeting of the enterprises
to convert these shares into normal voting shares.
Contrary to the case in the other Baltic countries, the advantages for employees in
small privatization was usually smaller than in large privatization because small
enterprises had already been  mostly sold in public auctions.
While programs for sale of state owned enterprises to foreigners were introduced
in 1992, until 1995 this program was used only in a limited number of cases. Also,
little use was made in Lithuania of  restitution of  industrial enterprises to former
owners.  Hence,  mployee ownership was an important element in the privatization
process in Lithuania, especially in large enterprises. Also, while the LIPSP
programme did not formally include special preferences for employees in small
privatization, because of inside information and access to resources for purchase
in the form of vouchers,  insiders have probably also had a relatively strong
position in the privatization of small firms. It should be noticed that although small
privatization included around half of the 6000 enterprises to be privatized in the
LIPSP program, the small enterpris s only covered a small percentage of the total
assets and the total number of employees.
Data from the Privatization Department in the Ministry of Economics clearly show
the spread of employee ownership over time in Lithuania. Soon after the start of
privatization, at the end of 1992, employees got a relatively small part of total
privatized equity and 67% of enterprises had no employee ownership. But in just
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two years there was an astonishing change. By 1994 fewer than 5% of the
privatized firms in the LIPSP program had no employee ownership and the
percentage of enterprises where the majority of privatized assets were taken over
by employees increased from 3% in 1991-1992, to 65% in 1993, and to 92% in
1994-1995. These developments reflect the massive increase in support for
employee take-overs. However, in most of the enterprises the state kept some
equity. Furthermore, many enterprises started to change ownership soon after
privatization. Therefore, the following results show a much lower percentage of
employee ownership.
Our ownership survey, undertaken in July 1994, elicited responses from 356
industrial enterprises. It confirms to some extent the rapid extension of employee
ownership in large enterprises in Lithuania, figure 17. By July 1994 only 5% of
these enterprises had no insider ownership and most of these 25 enterprises were
still state owned. 16% of the enterprises had 31-50% insider ownership, and 14%
of the enterprises had majority insider ownership. Most of these enterprises have
more shares owned by the employees than by managers. In July 1994 in only 13%
of  cases with some insider ownership did managers own more equity than do the
rest of employees. This result shows a strong difference from the Estonian data
where managers owned more than the other employees in most cases. The survey
data also indicate that ownership by foreigners plays a limited role in Lithuania. On
average only 2.5% of an enterprise is owned by foreigners.
As can be seen from figure 17, 15% of the industrial enterprises had insider
majority with employee dominance and only 3% had insider majority with manager
dominance in July 1994. As the entries in the lower rows of figure 17 indicate, the
degree of employee-ownership in July 1994 is not dependent on the time of
privatization. The difference in relation to the distribution of ownership at the time
of privatization is probably the result of two tendencies from the privatization date
to July 1994 - a gradual take-over by employees through enterprise reserves and
profits, and secondly the sale of some employee shares, with the strongest effect
in enterprises where employees
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Figure 17 Lithuania: Ownershipstructure July 1994, industry -
size, capital intensity, time of privatization.
majority
outsiders insiders
Frequency
row percent
state
foreign>dom domestic>f managers>e employees>m
no
majo-
rity
no
an-
swer
total
TOTAL 70 (20) 6 (2)  124 (35) 12 (3) 53 (15) 60 (17)31  (9) 356 (100)
EMPLOYEES
5-19
20-99
100-199
200-499
500-
1       
1 (33)
15 (32)
15 (18)
18 (18)
20 (18)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
2 (2)
4 (4)
0   (0)
11 (23)
36 (44)
38 (37)
39 (35)
1 (33)
0   (0)
1   (1)
2   (2)
8   (7)
0   (0)
4   (9)
12 (15)
19 (19)
18 (16)
0   (0)
3   (6)
15 (18)
21 (21)
21 (19)
 6      
1(33)
14(30)
4  (5)
3  (3)
3  (3)
7         
3 (100)
47 (100)
83 (100)
103 (100)
113 (100)
Average  1994
25% quartile
median
75% quartile
496
113
221
596
753
401
750
1084
616
168
327
753
1092
418
798
1831
639
207
322
737
657
194
311
793
333
70
94
131
601
153
304
722
BRANCHES
Mining, wood
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
41 (24)
18 (14)
11 (22)
2 (1)
3 (2)
1 (2)
40 (23)
62 (48)
22 (44)
5 (3)
4 (3)
3 (6)
30 (17)
17 (13)
6 (12)
43 (25)
14 (11)
3   (6)
3     
14 (8)
10 (8)
4 (8)
3         
175 (100)
128 (100)
50 (100)
total assets
/employee
average  1994
25% quartile
median
75% quart.
0-25% quart.
75-100% quart.
29867
9996
22232
37712
16 (20)
26 (33)
32838
18876
32004
39881
0  (0)
4  (5)
16699
 8545
13217
20711
30 (37)
12 (15)
31853
12006
24730
51948
1  (1)
5  (6)
20664
9141
17096
26427
12 (15)
12 (15)
27689
14872
21815
28731
7   (9)
17 (21)
21380
4505
8394
24638
15(19)
4  (5)
23002
9083
16856
27345
81 (100)
80 (100)
nom. Capital
/employee
average 1994
25% quartile
median
75% quart.
0-25% quart.
75-100% quart.
8669
768
3290
8571
15 (19)
31 (39)
5839
1738
3986
8714
0 (0)
3 (4)
2769
503
1319
3071
31 (38)
21 (26)
2403
315
1529
4398
5 (6)
3 (4)
1895
386
738
1733
20 (25)
6   (8)
7424
678
2698
5566
10 (13)
18 (22)
-
-
-
-
0 (0)
0 (0)
4695
497
1524
4236
81 (100)
82 (100)
year of
privatization
1991 (own 94)
1992 (own 94)
1993 (own 94)
1994 (own 95)
1995 (own 96)
total
0 (0)
0 (0)
2 (2)
1 (1)
3(20)
6
0 (0)
0 (0)
2 (3)
3 (4)
0 (0)
5
3(100)
56 (70)
42 (50)
34 (49)
7 (47)
142
0 (0)
0 (0)
7 (8)
0 (0)
1 (7)
8
0   (0)
14 (18)
9 (11)
7 (10)
3 (20)
33
0   (0)
8 (10)
21 (25)
21 (30)
1   (7)
51
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
4 (6)
0 (0)
4
3 (100)
78 (100)
83 (100)
70 (100)
15 (100)
249 (100)
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owned a high proportion of the shares. The last tendency can explain the difference
to the results from Ministry of Economics, which indicated a higher number of
majority employee ownership. The proportion of Ano maj rity@ is quite high in
general and especially in enterprises privatized in 1993 and 1994. This can be
explained by the state still keeping a relatively high proportion of shares in
especially the larger enterprises.
The Lithuanian industry ample consist of rather large enterprises with an average
employment in 1994 of 600 employees. Manager dominated insider majority has
the largest average, but the data do not reveal striking differences in the size-
structure. There are also no clear tendencies among the industrial branches shown
in figure 17.
The survey for construction were not undertaken before July 1995, but the results
show many of the same tendencies as in industry, figure 18. Out of 148 enterprises
only 5% had no employee ownership in July 1995, and 38% had majority insider
ownership, figure 25. However, for construction and trade there are more of the
enterprises with insider majority which have management dominance, 26%,
compared to employee dominance, 14%. However, this difference from the
tendency in industry partly reflect the fact that the numbers for construction and
trade are from July 1995. Leaving one more year for the change of ownership from
employees to managers. There are no striking tendencies in the variation of
ownership when comparing enterprises of different sizes except for a weak
tendency for higher management dominance in smaller companies. Comparing
construction and trade there are about the same degree of employee ownership.
However, managers are stronger in trade with 29% of the sample with insider
majority with manager dominance. In construction the percentage is 23%.
The most striking difference between the different owner groups in industrial
enterprises is the fact that insider owned and especially employee owned
enterprises have a relatively low nominal capital per employee, see figure 17. It is
the same tendency although not so strong as in Estonia. State owned, foreign
owned and no majority companies have relatively high capital intensity. Turning
to construction and trade there is another pattern with insider owned companies
around the average of nominal capital per employee. Only management dominated
enterprises have a slightly lower nominal capital per employee. Looking at the total
assets per employee insider owned companies in all the analyzed sectors follow to
a high degree the pattern of the average enterprise. This might indicate that in
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industry insiders and especially managers have been able to get a majority of the
shares at a relatively low price.
Figure 18 Lithuania:Ownershipstructure July 1995, construction and trade
                           - size, capital intensity, time of privatization.
Majority
Outsiders insiders
Frequency
row percent
state
foreign>dom domestic>f managers>e employees>m
no
majo-
rity
no
an-
swer
total
TOTAL 13 (9) 0 (0) 50 (34) 37 (26) 20 (14) 24 (17) 1 (1) 145 (100)
EMPLOYEES
5-19
20-99
100-199
200-
1 (17)
3   (6)
5 (12)
3   (8)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (17)
20 (37)
15 (37)
11 (28)
2 (33)
16 (30)
9 (22)
9 (23)
1 (17)
7 (13)
3   (7)
9  23)
1 (17)
8 (15)
9 (22)
6 (15)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (3)
0 (0)
5         
6 (100)
54 (100)
41 (100)
39 (100)
Average
25% quartile
median
75% quartile
151
78
136
211
-
-
-
-
134
65
134
183
173
72
106
208
214
73
172
251
173
48
116
206
383
-
-
-
165
68
124
213
BRANCHES
Construction
Trade
9 (12)
4   (6)
0 (0)
0 (0)
26 (34)
24 (36)
18 (23)
19 (29)
11 (14)
9 (14)
13 (17)
11 (17)
0 (0)
1 (1)
77 (100)
68 (100)
total assets
/employee
average
25% quartile
median
75% quartile
0-25% quartile
50-75% quart.
81609
14519
19345
34549
3   (9)
3 (10)
-
-
-
-
0 (0)
0 (0)
31434
14959
22707
36364
9 (28)
12 (39)
30174
10390
16000
38579
12 (38)
8 (26)
23078
14361
19727
24503
5 (16)
2   (6)
33641
15324
24943
36857
2   (6)
6 (19)
9022
-
-
-
1 (3)
0 (0)
34965
14362
21924
35522
32 (100)
31 (100)
nom. Capital
/employee
average
25% quartile
median
75% quartile 
0-25% quartile
50-75% quart.
4682
1398
3243
6206
2   (6)
5 (14)
-
-
-
-
0 (0)
0 (0)
4367
244
1302
6466
15 (42)
13 (36)
3090
588
1399
3250
  8 (22)
5 (14)
4457
505
1097
7455
5 (14)
5 (14)
8794
632
2272
10497
6 (17)
8 (22)
-
-
-
-
0 (0)
0 (0)
4818
492
1622
5589
36 (100)
36 (100)
year of
privatization     
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
total
0  (0)
2  (7)
0  (0)
2  (5)
0  (0)
4  (3)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (50)
11 (37)
15 (38)
13 (33)
5 (31)
45 (36)
1 (50)
9 (30)
13 (33)
10 (26)
3 (19)
36 (29)
0   (0)
4 (13)
3   (8)
9 (23)
4 (25)
20 (16)
0   (0)
4 (13)
8 (21)
5 (13)
4 (25)
21 (17)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
2 (100)
30 (100)
39 (100)
39 (100)
16 (100)
126 (100)
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Figure 19   Percent of employees who are not owners - Lithuania.
Shares owned by
employees
in % of total shares
0% 0-10% 10-30% 30-50%
employee-
owned
30-50%
management
owned
50-100%
employee-
owned
50-100%
management
owned
Total
number of
employees
totalno
own
total no
own
Total no
own
total no
own
total no
own
total no
own
total no
own
total no
own
firm
s
5 -19 employees 12100% 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 8 25% 36 83% 3
20-99 employees 584100% 70439% 46518% 209 5% 0 - 28916% 0 - 327862% 47
100-199 employees1033100% 315544% 273831% 153521% 493 39% 221027% 160 67% 1175742% 83
200-499 employees1164100% 571648% 764431% 867115% 1535 21% 572321% 1184 28% 3258032%103
> 500 employees511100%1329839%4068219%3912113% 5195 32%2443612%10241 8%13830021%113
total July 1994 3304100%2287342%5152922%4953613% 7223 30%3265815%1159311%18595125%349
5 -19 employees 0 - 31 0% 35 14% 0 - 17 47% 33 3% 36 53% 15222% 9
20-99 employees1033100% 223754% 108652% 48221% 479 54% 80230% 1184 66% 783460%123
100-199 employees1308100% 375759% 404346% 291130% 1858 60% 99928% 1975 55% 1724853%120
200-499 employees1717100% 747050%1283839% 525726% 3193 53% 268035% 2900 55% 3643844%120
> 500 employees1101100%2585842%1779827%2372521% 6732 33%1416228% 5125 49% 9501233% 87
total July 1996 5159100%3935346%3580034%3237522%1227943%1867629%1122054%15668439%459
Figure 19 show results for the internal distribution in the industrial enterprises in
Lithuania. First, it is striking that the number of non-owners in the Lithuanian
sample is relatively low compared to the other countries. 75% of the employees in
the sample were owners in July 1994. For the management staff the corresponding
percentage were as high as 87%. This low percentage of non-owners among the
employees suggests that the Lithuanian voucher system has helped employees as
a group to overcome the problem of lack of capital.  There is also a tendency for
the percentage of non owners to be higher in large enterprises than in smaller, the
opposite result of the situation in Estonia. Finally, figure 19 show a strong tendency
for almost all categories of an increasing share of non-owners. In total the share of
owners fall to 61% in July 1996.
The dynamics of ownership is illustrated through the transition matrices shown in
the figures 20-23. Figure 20 for industry shows a strong tendency of a fall in the
number of enterprises with majority insider ownership and employee dominance.
The number is more than halved from July 1994 to July 1995. From July 1994 to
July 1996, 40% of the 53 employee owned enterprises have changed to outside
domestic ownership, 19% to no majority and 6% to management ownership. A few
enterprises have changed to more employee ownership. Most of these changes took
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place from 1994 to 1995. It is worth noting that there do not seem to be the same
tendency in Lithuania as in Estonia with stability for employee ownership in small
enterprises. All size groups show a steep fall from 1994 to 1996. Outside
ownership has increased both for foreign own rship which increased from 6 to 18
and domestic ownership which increased from 124 to 168. The number of industrial
enterprises with insider majority with management dominance are relatively stable.
However, only 4 or 33% have stayed in this category for both 1994 and 1996. In
total the Lithuanian industrial enterprises show very dynamic changes. About 40%
of the enterprises (excluding no answers) have changed category in the period of
two years.
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Figure 20  Transition matrix Lithuania - industry
                   majority July 1994 by July 1996
majority July 1996
Outsiders insidersMajority
July 1994
state
Foreign domesticmanagers employees
no
majo-
rity
no
answer
total
State 47
(67)
2
(3)
9
(13)
1
(1)
2
(3)
4
(6)
5
(7)
70
(100)
Outsider
Foreign>domestic
0
(0)
4
(67)
2
(33)
 0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
2
(100)
Outsider
Domestic>foreign
0
(0)
8
(6)
 98 
(79)
4
(3)
2
(2)
2
(2)
10
(8)
124
(100)
Insider
Managers>employees
0
(0)
1
(8)
3
(25)
4
(33)
1
(8)
2
(17)
1
(8)
12
(100)
Insider
Employees>managers
1
(2)
1
(2)
21
(40)
 3
(6)
14
(26)
10
(19)
3
(6)
53
(100)
no majority 0
(0)
2
(3)
32
(53)
1
(2)
3
(5)
16
(27)
6
(10)
60
(100)
no answer 2
(6)
0
(0)
3
(10)
1
(3)
2
(6)
1
(3)
22
(71)
31
(100)
total  July 1994 70
(20)
6
(2)
124
(35)
12
(3)
53
(15)
60
(17)
31
(9)
356
(100)
total  July 1995 59
(17)
9
(3)
148
(42)
14
(4)
25
(7)
53
(15)
48
(13)
356
(100)
total  July 1996 50
(14)
18
(5)
168
(47)
14
(4)
24
(7)
35
(10)
47
(13)
356
(100)
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Figure 21  Transition matrix Lithuania - construction and trade
         majority July 1995 by July 1996
majority July 1996
outsiders insidersMajority
July 1995
state
foreign domesticmanagers employees
no
majo-
rity
no
answer
total
July
1995
State 10
(77)
0
(0)
2
(15)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
1
(8)
13
(100)
Outsider
foreign>domestic
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
-
Outsider
Domestic>foreign
0
(0)
2
(4)
43
(86)
2
(4)
0
(0)
0
(0)
3
(6)
50
(100)
Insider
Managers>employees
0
(0)
0
(0)
2
(5)
31
(84)
2
(5)
1
(3)
1
(3)
37
(100)
Insider
Employees>managers
0
(0)
0
(0)
2
(10)
1
(5)
15
(75)
2
(10)
0
(0)
20
(100)
no majority 0
(0)
0
(0)
6
(25)
2
(8)
1
(4)
15
(63)
0
(0)
24
(100)
no answer 0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
1
(100)
1
(100)
total  July 1996 10
(7)
2
(1)
55
(38)
36
(25)
18
(12)
18
(12)
6
(4)
145
(100)
For construction and trade 18% of the enterprises have changed category during
one year from July 1995 to July 1996, figure 21. Employee dominated insider
owned enterprises seem to be more stable than in industry. However, in the same
period from 1995 to 1996 employee ownership was also rather stable in industry.
In construction and trade the number falls from 20 to 18. Most chances are
recorded for no majority enterprises falling from 24 to 18 with most enterprises
going to domestic outside ownership. The number of foreign owned enterprises
increases from 0 to 2.
The transition matrices in figure 22 and figure 23 show the strong tendency away
from employee ownership. For the industrial enterprises in figure 22, only 23 are
shifting to more, while 137 are shifting to lower employee ownership and 139 are
unchanged - a rate of change of 54%. There is especially a strong change away
from majority employee ownership falling from 30 to 8 and enterprises with 30-
50% employee ownership falling from 79 to 42. The categories with low employee
ownership are increasing. A similar tendency can be observed in figure 23 with
enterprises in construction and trade. 7 enterprises have had increasing, 31 falling,
and 101 have had constant
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Figure 22  Transition matrix Lithuania - industry
           degrees of employee ownership, July 1994  by July 1996
July 1994 July 1996
Employeeshares0% 0-5% 5-10% 10-30%30-50%50-100%100%
no data  total
0% 20 (74) 1  (4) 1   (4) 2   (7) 0   (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (11) 27 (100)
0-5% 3 (5)38 (68) 5   (9) 3   (5) 0   (0) 1 (2) 0 (0) 6 (11) 56 (100)
5-10% 0 (0)19 (68) 3 (11) 2   (7) 0   (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (14) 28 (100)
10-30% 2 (2)22 (21)21 (20)48 (46) 5   (5) 1 (1) 0 (0) 6   (6)105 (100)
30-50% 2 (3) 8 (10) 7   (9) 29 (37)28 (35) 2 (3) 0 (0) 3   (4) 79 (100)
50-100% 1 (3) 2   (7)  3 (10) 8 (28) 9 (31) 2 (7) 0 (0) 4 (14) 29 (100)
100% 0 (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 1(100) 0   (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0   (0) 1 (100)
no data 0 (0) 4 (13) 0   (0) 3  (10) 0   (0) 2 (6) 0 (0) 22 (70) 31 (100)
total July 1994 27 (8)56 (16)28   (8) 105
(29)
79 (22) 29 (8) 1 (0) 31   (9)356 (100)
total July 1995 25 (7)69 (19)36 (10) 111
(31)
53 (15) 14 (4) 0 (0) 48 (14)356 (100)
total July 1996 28 (8)94 (26)40 (11)96 (27)42 (12) 8 (2) 0 (0) 48 (13)356 (100)
Figure 23  Transition matrix Lithuania - construction and trade
         degrees of employee ownership, July 1995 by July 1996
July 1995 July 1996
Employeeshares0% 0-5% 5-10% 10-30%30-50%50-
100%
100%
no
data   total
0% 8 (67) 0   (0) 0   (0) 2 (17) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 2  (25) 12 (100)
0-5% 0   (0) 20
(87)
0   (0) 1   (4) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 2    (9) 23 (100)
5-10% 0   (0) 4 (27)10 (67) 0   (0) 0   (0) 1   (7) 0   (0) 0    (0) 15 (100)
10-30% 0   (0) 2   (3)12 (20) 42 (71) 2   (3) 0   (0) 0   (0) 1    (2) 59 (100)
30-50% 0   (0) 1   (4) 0   (0) 7 (28) 16 (64) 1   (4) 0   (0) 0    (0) 25 (100)
50-100% 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 3 (30) 2 (20) 5 (50) 0   (0) 0    (0) 10 (100)
100% 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0    (0) 0 (100)
no data  0  
(0)
0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 1(100) 1 (100)
total July 1996 8   (6) 27 22 (15) 55 (38) 20 (14) 7   (5) 0   (0) 6    (4)145 (100)
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(18)
employee ownership in the period July 1995 to July 1996, a rate of change of 27%
. For management ownership (not reported) for industrial enterprises there is from
July 1994 to July 1995 a tendency to increasing management ownership (56 up, 36
down and 208 constant, a rate of change of 31%) while in the following year from
1995 to 1996 there is stability with 33 up, 31 down and 231 constant, 22% rate of
change. The stability from 1995 to 1996 is also seen for management ownership in
the sample for construction and trade with 14 up, 13 down and 112 constant, 19%
rate of change.
In conclusion for Lithuania it is seen that privatization to a high degree favored
broad employee ownership, but in the years following privatization there has been
a strong and fast and dynamic process toward both management and especially
outside domestic ownership. This tendency is covering both industry, construction
and trade and all sizes of companies.
VII   Conclusions and Implications
By using new and often rich panel data for large samples of firms in each of the
Baltic countries we provide some of the most reliable information on the nature and
dynamics of ownership structures for the Baltic countries to date (and for any
transition economies). By international standards in the west, one of the most
significant differences that emerges is that a remarkable degree of insider
ownership has been introduced in a very short period. Thus in January 1995 it is
estimated that in 30%-60% of the private companies in the three countries insiders
own at least 50% of the firm. The percentage is highest in Latvia and apparently
lowest in Lithuania, but in Lithuania the number are relatively high in large
companies and insiders own shares in nearly all companies including those which
do not have a single group owning the majority. In the industrial enterprises in
Lithuania around 75% of the employees own shares. In Estonia, we find an
incidence of employee ownership, with one in four employees owning shares in
private firms in 1995. By contrast,  the otal value of US ESOPs is estimated to be
less than 3% of the market value of quoted companies (Blasi d Kruse,  1991:12)
while in Japan the comparable figure is less than 1% (reported by Jones and Kato,
1995). Moreover in both the US and Japan, the western countries which appear to
have the largest amounts of employee ownership, the spread of employee
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ownership has taken place gradually, over at least fifteen years.
Another finding that emerges is that there are major differences in ownership
patterns between countries. In particular, foreign ownership is very important in
Estonia while minor important in Latvia and of negligible importance in Lithuania.
In Lithuania, nearly all enterprises have at least an element of employee ownership,
the broad group of employees have a quite strong position versus management, and
there are fewer non-owners among the employees than in Estonia and Latvia. In
Lithuanian industry the employees dominate managers in relation to ownership. In
Estonia and Latvia the two types of ownership have about the same weight when
measured in January 1995. However, in Latvia there are a higher proportion of
enterprises with majority insider ownership than in Lithuania. In Lithuania a
relatively high proportion of enterprises are categorized as Ano majority@, no single
group - state, outsiders or insiders - have the majority of the shares. This is mainly
because the state has kept a substantial minority stake in many enterprises. In both
Estonia and Latvia there is a considerable concentration of shares at a single group
of owners leaving only 2-6% of the private enterprises in the category of Ano
majority@. Also, whereas insider ownership is strongest in Estonia and Latvia in
agriculture and weakest in services and transport, and in Estonia trade is also quite
weak, while in Lithuania we find that insider ownership has a strong presence in
trading firms.
In all sectors in Estonia and in Latvia and in construction and trade in Lithuania
there is a tendency to a higher proportion of enterprises with insider majority in
small enterprises. This is especially the case for management owned enterprises
(family-enterprises). In Estonia and Latvia the remaining state owned enterprises
in the samples are relatively large. This is not the case in Lithuania.
In Estonia and Latvia there is a strong tendency for a relatively low capital intensity
in insider owned enterprises. This is especially the case when measured as nominal
capital per employee, but this is also the tendency for total assets per employee.
Here is a significant difference from the situation in Lithuania. Total assets per
employee is about the same in insider as in outsider owned companies. Nominal
capital per employee in employee owned enterprises in industry there is lower than
for other ownership types, but the tendency is  much weaker than it was the case
in Estonia and Latvia. It is probably the higher level of support for employees in
Lithuania which explains this difference. In the other countries insiders including
the broad group of employees could only afford a take-over when the price
reflected in the nominal capital per employee was relatively low.
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Most of the results referred earlier covers the situation on January 1995 or earlier.
However, for all three countries we have also ownership data for the period two
years later. This allows us to analyze the dynamics of ownership. In Estonia and
Latvia the data show a quite fast change in ownership. The dynamics are not so
profound in Latvia, however, here the survey covers only 167 enterprises and they
were asked about historic data, implying a bias in the direction of stability. Thus,
our conclusion is that there has probably been a rather dynamic change also in
Latvia. At the same time it is striking that the changes go in the same direction in
all three countries. First, there is a strong change away from employee dominated
ownership. Most of them change to management dominated insider majority, but
also many enterprises change to domestic outside ownership. There is a tendency,
most pronounced in Estonia, especially for change away from employee ownership
in large enterprises. Also the group of enterprises with Ano majority@ are falling in
all three countries.
The tendency away from employee ownership can also be found on the personal
level in the enterprises. The number of non-owning employees are increasing in all
three countries, except for small enterprises in Estonia. This confirms the tendency
for higher stability of employee ownership in small enterprises.
In attempting to account for these patterns of  and changes in ownership (both
across and within countries), at this early stage of data collection, our work is
necessarily preliminary.  However, when considering differences across countries,
it is important to recognize that in key respects - including level of development,
size of the economy and geography -  the three Baltic Countries began with very
similar conditions. Subsequently, despite these initial similarities, profound
differences in ownership patterns have emerged. Undoubtedly some of these
differences reflect different policies - for example, in Estonia, the greater incidence
of foreign ownership and of firms with dominant owners, is consistent with policy
initiatives in those directions. At the same time it is also most unlikely that different
policies will account for all of the variation in patterns across countries. It is more
likely that the cross country  differences suggest that ownership structures are
profoundly affected by a host of other factors, many of which operate primarily at
the societal level. Thus, undoubtedly the high level of foreign ownership in Estonia
also reflects geographical and linguistic proximity to Finland. By contrast the stress
on non-managerial ownership in Lithuania reflects deeper egalitarian values as well
as an ability, unlike in Latvia and Lithuania,  to devise policies that did not have to
respond to nationalist concerns.
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 Equally the heterogeneity of patterns of and changes in ownership points to the
potentially important role played by market conditions that influence firms
differently as well as other firm-specific factors, such as differences in the informal
distribution of power. While pinpointing these specific factors will be the subject
of future work, we would expect that economic factors will play a large role in
accounting for variation in ownership patterns across and within firms.12
One implication of these findings is to suggest, as some have argued (e.g. Nuti,
1996), that in focusing only on simple measures of ownership, potentially 
important forces behind enterprise restructuring (such as the distribution of
ownership, the percentage of employees that own shares, and interactions with
participation in decision-making) are being ignored. Indeed the failure to include
measures of these forces  may be part of the reason why many empirical studies
ostensibly have failed to uncover strong effects of  different forms of ownership on
economic outcomes (e.g. Earle et al, 1995). 
Another implication is that although there is a clear tendency away from employee
ownership there is still a rather high proportion of these enterprises in all three
Baltic economies and they are likely to be a feature of the economic landscape in
many transition economies for a considerable time period. In turn, so that the full
potential of employee ownership might be realized,  this suggests the need for
further studies and ultimately the devising of  policies that are appropriate for the
special circumstances of the transition economies. But even now it is clear that our
findings imply that the new structures of ownership will not emerge uniformly and
that simply by A letting the planners move out and markets move in@ usually has not
produced optimal ownership structures nor is it likely to do so in the immediate
future. It would appear that there is a need for technical assistance to guide the
evolution of institutions and that ways of developing packages of institutional
reforms need to be considered. There is an urgent need for on-going work to
monitor the evolution of new forms of ownership as well as (when  economic data
are available) to examine more rigorously the determinants of these structures and
the possible consequences of these different forms of ownership for economic
performance.
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  Endnotes
                    
1. These include Blasi et al. (1997) and Earle et al. (1995) for Russia, Murrell and Korsun
(1994) for Mongolia and Jones (1994) for Bulgaria. For overviews see  World Bank, 1996 and
EBRD, 1996)
2. These distinction are often relevant both in relation to the development in the ownership structure
and also in later analyses about economic performance.
3. The data collection exercise on ownership is part of a larger and on-going process. A
major focus is to examine links between ownership patterns and economic performance.
    
4. Note that a number of complementary case studies also have been undertaken. For discussion
of these cases see Mygind (ed., 1996).
5. Note, that the survey methods used in Lithuania means that the distribution of ownership cannot
be taken as representative for included sectors or the whole economy.
6. For more general discussions of developments in Estonia during early transition see World
Bank (1993), Purju (1996). More general discussions for the Baltics include  Bradshaw et
al. (1994), Sutela (1994), Reardon (1996) and Frydman et al. (1993).
7. The new cooperatives are best known for the case of Russia. See and Bim et al. (1994).
8. Even after the sample is "normalized", so that the different sectors and size are given their correct
weight in the overall population, while the percentage of foreign owned capital falls to 37%, this still
shows the strong influence of foreign ownership in Estonian privatization. However, if calculations
are made according to the number of firms, then foreign ownership is found to play a smaller role.
This is because the nominal capital is much higher in foreign owned companies. 
9. A t test on the differences in means for the degree of ownership held by Aother employees@
in 1990 or 1991 compared to 1992 or 1993 or 1994, is always significant at the 1% level.
                                                                 
10. For more general discussions of developments in Latvia during early transition see
Davies (1996), Shteinbuka (1994) and World Bank (1993). 
11. More general discussions of developments in Lithuania include World Bank (1993) and
Cicinskas (1994).
12.  Work on the  incidence of employee ownership is quite limited. For example, see Jones and Kato
(1993) and Jones and Pliskin (1997).
